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In an earlier paper (Alagh, Munish, 2011) it was shown that macro economics matters in 
agriculture. The relevance of understanding the impact of macro-economic policy on 
agriculture was outlined, A forecasting exercise detailed the structure and response of 
supply  to  prices  in  the  non  foodgrain  sector  of  the  economy.  The  market  and  more 
generally macroeconomic policy impacts on agriculture needed to be understood. This is 
reviewed  in  this  paper  and  it  proceeds  onwards  from  there  to  show  that  within 
macroeconomic policy specific policies such as an appropriate fiscal-monetary policy 
mix is relevant for the economy, and that fiscal policy should be seen as a process. It is 
shown that fiscal overspending outside agriculture should be curbed. The composition of 
fiscal  policy  relating  to  agriculture  particularly  public  investment  and  subsidies  is 
studied.  It  is  seen  that  periods  of  sustainable  deficits  are  periods  of  rising  public 
investment  in  agriculture.  ICOR’s  are  rising  but  less  in  the  public  sector  suggesting 
externalities. Crowding in of private investment seems likely. Following this the political 
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Macro-Economic Policy Outcomes and Agriculture 
Relation between Fiscal Deficits and Investment in Agriculture 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we examine the following assertions 
·  Deficit outside agriculture leads to an increase in unproductive investment 
(give  aways)  vis-à-vis  productive  investment  in  agriculture.  The  paper 
analyses  the  arguments  of  Chambers  and  Just  (1987)  with  an  Indian 
perspective in order to examine this macroeconomic proposition. 
·  Decline  in  Economy-wide  Deficits  can  be  seen  to  be  correlated  with 
increase in agricultural investment. Experience in the post liberalization 
phase is examined to test this hypothesis.  
 
·  Epochs of high and sustainable deficits are delineated and the effect on 
capital formation in agriculture estimated 
·  Public  Investment  in  Agriculture  can  be  crowding  in.  We  relook  Errol 
D’Souza (2008) with a sectoral perspective (agriculture) to examine this 
assertion. 
 
The Link with Earlier Work 
 
In the earlier paper (Alagh, M., 2011c), macroeconomic linkages with agriculture were 
focused on. Alternative ways of looking at Indian agriculture were differentiated. The 
question that emerged is: Is there a structural constraint in Indian agriculture or does 
Indian agriculture work in a system in which as demand rises and prices rise, on account 
of macro economic reasons, supply responds. The constraints could be institutional or 
policy  determined  in  the  food  grains  part  of  the  economy,  with  the  non  food  grain 
economy being responsive to market and non price factors mattering particularly in that 
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These  kinds  of  general  hypotheses  required  an  analysis  of  macroeconomic  policy 
particularly of trends and impacts of government expenditure and money supply. What 
are the impacts of such policies on agricultural prices and interest rates for agriculture? 
How  do  they  impact  on  agricultural  demand,  supplies  and  investment?  Do  monetary 
shocks and budget deficits affect farm output and the farm-non farm price ratio? It was 
noted that these kind of questions have gained  urgency in recent discussions both of 
agricultural  and  macro  policies.  In  evaluating  the  impact  of  macroeconomic  policy 
changes, the mix of monetary and fiscal policies has to be evaluated. Does monetary 
policy  at  the  national  level  have  an  influence  on  farm  credit  programs,  does  fiscal 
irresponsibility outside agriculture lead to budget excesses in agriculture, so should fiscal 
overspending  outside  agriculture  be  the  target  variable  to  be  controlled?  The  impact 
which  macroeconomic  policies  have  on  the  nature  and  range  of  agricultural  policy 
options was well documented in American and international literature. 
 
The relevance of the approach was illustrated in a macroeconomic partial equilibrium 
framework of an important agricultural outcome. If expansionary/contractionary macro 
policy (Monetary-Fiscal policy mix) led to rise/fall in money income, it would impact 
significantly on agricultural demand. Did this then lead to fluctuations in agricultural 
supply?  There  were  many  ways  to  analyze  this  kind  of  question.  We  used  a  partial 
economy framework using lags to help the specifications of our model. 
 
The question of the farm nonfarm price ratio as determined by macro features came up 
consistently and was a central issue in our literature review. Purapre Balakrishnan had an 
erudite refutation of the farm non farm price ratio determining agricultural supplies for an 
early period. We showed that the picture changed for the period since 1980. Prices and in 
turn the macro factors which drive them mattered. These results were used to argue that 
we  can  use  them  for  forecasting  purposes  in  the  remaining  part  of  this  decade,  the 
analysis of which would be critical for policy say in the Twelfth Plan (See, M.Alagh, 
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The  forecasting  model  took  the  actual  acreage  and  output  numbers  in  each  year  and 
predicted the next years. The model could have been used to give smooth forecasts for a 
number of years. But that was not the motivation since this was not a model of long term 
growth. It was intended to predict the consequences of macro policies on agricultural 
output in the sense in which the major studies in the literature review do (Belongia, Just 
and Chambers, etc.). What it said was that if the economy is contracted or expanded, that 
will have an impact on farm/non farm price ratios and in turn determine output in the next 
year given the lags in acreage response. It would be also possible in this structure to work 
out the farm-non farm price ratio with which food inflation was avoided in the next year.  
 
The  direction  of  change  was  largely  predicted  correctly  by  the  graphs.  They  also 
predicted  downturns  and  upswings  or  the  direction  of  the  cycle.  In  many  years  the 
numbers were close to the actuals. This was demonstration that macro policies impact 
agriculture in a significant manner. The work had possibilities for further understanding 
of macro policy impacts on agriculture. These are outlined in this paper. 
 
Specific Macroeconomic Policies and the Fiscal Monetary Mix 
 
Using a closed economy macro economic framework consider a debt, interest rate and 
growth formulation (D’souza, 2008, pp.329-30): 
 
If bt=Bt/Yt, the debt-GDP ratio. 
dt=Dt/Yt, the primary deficit/gdp ratio. 
and the one period growth rate of GDP is g=Yt-Yt-1/Yt-1=Yt/Yt-1-1 
Or 1+g=Yt/Yt-1 
Then we can rewrite the Government Budget Constraint as = Bt  = (1+r) Bt-1+D 
Where r=interest rate, Bt=Debt and Dt=Primary Deficit, as 
bt= (1+r/1+g)bt-1+dt                         (Equation 1) 
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One can ask at any point in time that (D’Souza, p. 337), if the historically given debt at 
that time is to be continued at that constant level forever, and if there is no change in 
interest rates and the growth of GDP, (the current configuration of the economy continues 
to prevail) what is the primary deficit that can sustain this time path of the economy? 
 
An application of this perspective to government deficits and debt begins by noting that 
the  budget  constraint  of  the  government  implies  that  new  debt is  issued  for  either  if 
primary  expenditures  (net  of  non-debt  finance  related  expenditures  such  as  interest 
payments and transfer payments such as subsidies) exceed current revenues, i.e., there is 
a primary deficit or if the government must pay interest on existing debt.  
 
This answer is derived from equation 1 
as bt= (1+r/1+g)bt-1+dt                         (Equation 1) 
Or, 1-(1+r/1+g) bt-1= dt, when: bt= bt-1 
dt= (g-r/1+g) bt-1(Equation 2) 
 
This gives the primary-deficit/GDP ratio that is required in order to sustain the existing 
level of debt in the economy. This is a long run concept, derived for a steady state where 
interest rates and GDP growth do not change. There is in practice no necessity that the 
growth rate in a period is the steady state growth rate of the economy. This expression 
makes it clear that the debt-GDP ratio increases because government issues debt to cover 
a  primary  deficit  and  to  pay  interest  on  existing  debt.  If  interest  rates  increase,  the 
government must increase debt by a factor (1+r) to pay the interest on existing debt, 
which causes a rise in the debt-GDP ratio. But if GDP growth improves (1+g) increases, 
this increases the tax revenues of the government as taxes increase with GDP resulting in 
a reduction in the debt-GDP ratio. 
 
Those who believe in the power of fiscal expansions would argue that as the growth rate 
of the economy picks up and with g > r in the above expression, the debt-GDP ratio will 
in fact decline and in that sense the current debt- GDP ratio is sustainable. Their belief in 
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presumption that the debt is sustainable. This was true in the years 2006-2008 when the 
actual primary deficit/GDP ratio was below the sustainable deficit/GDP ratio (Table 1) 
 
Table 1 
Macro Variables 2005/06 to 2009/10 
 
Year  2005-06  2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10 
















Real Interest rate on Central 
Government Securities 













Growth rate of GDP  ---------  9.6  9.3  6.8  8 
Sustainable Primary-Deficit/GDP 
ratio 
.56  .42  .66  .36   
 
Note:  1.  Debt/GDP  Data  for  2009-10  are  Revised  Estimates  and  Debt/GDP  data  for 
2010-11 are Budget Estimates 
2. Debt/GDP-the percentages are calculated based on the data for GDP at current market 
prices with base year 2004-05 
3. Debt/GDP data are from Table 237, R.B.I, Handbook of Statistics, 2011. 
4. Primary Deficit/GDP Data for 2009-10 are Revised Estimates and data for 2010-11 are 
Budget Estimates. 
5. Negative (-) sign for Deficit indicates surplus 
6. Percentages are calculated based on the data for GDP at current market prices with 
base year 2004-2005 
7. Deficit/GDP is from Table 236, R.B.I., Handbook of Statistics, 2011. 
8.  Interest  Rate  on  Central  Government  Securities  is  from  Table  119,  Handbook  of 
Statistics, 2011. Wholesale Price Index (Average of Weeks) - Annual Variation is from 
Table 232, Handbook of Statistics, 2011. 
9.  Growth  Rate  of  GDP-TABLE  224:  Select  Macro-Economic  Aggregates  -  Growth 
Rates and Investment Rates (At Constant Prices) Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 
Economy 2011 Data for the last three years are provisional, quick and revised estimates 
respectively. 
 
The  primary  deficit/GDP  ratio  was  sustainable  in  these  years  (2006-08)  because  the 
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Clearly this analysis for a period after the illustrations in De Souza itself, the conclusion 
can be reached that “policy should not be seen as an event but rather as a process.” (Errol 
D’Souza, 2005, p.1488).  The real issue for this paper is the relation of all this with 
agriculture. 
 
Getting  back  to  the  main  theme,  the  place  to  attack  fiscal  deficits  may  be  outside 
agriculture rather than focus on lowering public investment in agriculture which may 
harm  agriculture.  (Chambers  and  Just,  87).  Like  in  the  US  in  India  too  some  have 
recognized  that  fiscal  deficits  can  have  severe  consequences  for  agriculture  (Storm, 
1992),  but  there  has  been  little  analysis  of  the  way  in  which  deficits  impinge  on 
agriculture.  In  this  paper  we  first  adapt  Chamber  and  Just  to  the  Indian  agricultural 
economy. Fiscal irresponsibility in a nonagricultural sector of the economy can lead to 
increased spending on government expenditure on agriculture when Minimum Support 
Prices are fixed in nominal terms. The chain of reasoning is simple. Overspending in a 
nonagricultural sector of the economy raises a deficit that must be financed and financing 
the deficit requires higher interest rates and exchange rates both of which depress prices 
for  exportable  agricultural  commodities.  Falling  market  prices  thus  cause  higher 
expenditure  from  government  for  farmers  (Compensatory  Government  Support 
Expenditure) and probably higher expenditures on farm programs because the decreasing 
market prices for the farmer are accompanied by fixed minimum support prices  The 
place to attack budget excesses in agriculture might be outside of agriculture rather than 
in instituting drastic cuts in government support to agriculture which may help the budget 
but ultimately damage long-run competitiveness in world markets. 
 
 
This  analysis  Chambers  and  Just  (87)  assumes  that  the  budget  is  intertemporally 
constrained so that any current flow deficit must be made up in a later period. This is 
done using a three period model where the case of a flow deficit in the first period is 
compared to the case of a period-by-period balanced budget. Relatively more spending in 
the first period than in the balanced budget case is referred to as "overspending" or "fiscal 
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done  above  is  in  a  sense  carried  forward  for  its  consequences  for  the  agricultural 
economy. 
 
In a slight adjustment of Chamber’s model we consider two periods instead of three. In 
our  version  conceptually,  for  example,  the  first  period  corresponds  to  the  1991-2004 
period  in  India  during  which  deficits  were  high.  The  second  period  represents  the 
remainder of the 2000-2010 decade during which actions to repay some of the cumulative 
budget  deficit  were  necessary.  Analytically  these  necessary  future  adjustments  are 
integrated  into  the  model  by  requiring  an  intertemporally  balanced  budget.  In  other 
words, the analysis constrains the ending cumulative deficit level.  
 
Specifically, the intertemporal budget constraint is 
Bt=0, t=1, 2, given by t=1991-2004, t=2=2004-2010 
Gt=G ˆ (Mt,rt,s2 t ,B t)  
Gt is government expenditure in time period t.  
 sit is the producer price in sector i at time t, 
 rt is the current interest rate. 
Mt is the money supply 
B t is the preexisting cumulative government deficit in period t 
 
Government  expenditures  required  to  balance  the  current  budget  depends  on  the 
preexisting  government  deficit,  the  money  supply  which  determines  interest  and 
exchange  rates,  government  revenues  raised  by  the  income  tax,  and  expenditures  on 
agricultural  subsidies.  Because  the  government  possesses  several  instruments  for 
controlling the deficit, the following three possibilities can be examined for next-period 
adjustment: 
(a) A reduction in government spending  
(b) An increase in the money supply and 
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Theoretical Investment and Subsidy Policies 
 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy can play an output and productivity enhancing role. In the 
discussion on crowding out of investment (Dornbusch, 2004), public investment can also 
play a crowding in role of investment in the agricultural sector. Errol D’ Souza (Errol D’ 
Souza, 2011) has also outlined conditions in which government expenditures can play an 
output enhancing and productivity expansion role, under specified conditions. 
 
In times of recession deficit financing helps to boost aggregate demand and to reduce 
unemployment when agents respond slowly to information that enables them to update 
expectations or when wages or prices are rigid. Aggregate expenditures that result from 
the debt financing of the deficit can affect the growth rate of the aggregate output of the 
economy. In national accounts, government expenditure is the sum of consumption and 
investment expenditure. The link between government expenditures and macroeconomic 
outcomes when government spending includes public investment also needs working out. 
Government expenditures on roads, ports, railways, airports, power, irrigation projects 
and canals, and on public education and health improve the productivity of private factors 
of  production.  When  the  productivity  of  agriculture  improves  due  to  such  public 
investments, agricultural farms are able to produce more output per unit of input. This 
results  in  an  upward  shift  of  the  production  function.  In  turn  this  results  in  a  shift 
outwards of the aggregate supply curve for agriculture.  
 
If some portion of the additional government spending be public investment expenditure 
that  enhances  the  productivity  of  business  enterprises,  there  are  two  impacts  of  the 
increase in public investment expenditure to consider:  
 
￿  On the supply side the increase in public investment improves the productivity 
of business enterprises and increases the potential output of the economy with 
a rightward shift of the AS  (aggregate Supply) curve. 
￿  On the demand side the deficit financed increase in public expenditure shifts 
the  standard  IS  curve  rightward  and  the  aggregate  demand  curve 
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Some private investment and consumption expenditure will have been crowded out due 
to the rise in the interest rate resulting from this expansionary fiscal policy as in the case 
of  pure  government  consumption  expenditure.  The  reduction  in  the  stock  of  private 
capital as private investment is adversely affected reduces the potential capacity of the 
output of the economy  and will shift the AS curve leftwards. This is because public 
investment has crowded out and substituted some private investment through raising the 
cost of capital.  
 
If, however, public investment is complementary to private investment, then, the increase 
in public investment by virtue of increasing the productivity of private firms induces 
them  to  increase  their  investment  expenditure. According  to  De  Souza,  the  empirical 
evidence for India is that public investment is complementary to and crowds in private 
investment. An increase in productivity also increases the marginal product of capital, 
and induces greater private investment. This will cause the IS curve to shift further to the 
right.  
 
Let us suppose that the increase in productivity and the increase in the wage rate and 
incomes from the increased public investment in agriculture induce an increase in interest 
sensitive private expenditures in agriculture. If this occurs in the net there will be no 
decline  in  private  investment  spending  and  consequently  no  decline  in  the  stock  of 
private capital. The leftward shift of the AS curve due to crowding out will be exactly 
offset by a rightward shift of the AS curve due to crowding in. The general conclusion, 
however, can be stated in two parts:  
(1) As long as the decline in private investment is smaller than the increase in 
public investment and the marginal product of public capital equals the marginal product 
of private capital the potential output of the economy as given by the  AS curve shifts to 
the right.  
(2)  If  the  decline  in  private  investment  is  larger  than  the  increase  in  public 
investment  but  the  marginal  product  of  public  capital  is  sufficiently  larger  than  the 
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AS curve still shifts to the right.  
The  composition  of  government  expenditures  is  therefore  important  to  the 
macroeconomic  outcome  of  a  deficit  financed  increase  in  public  expenditure.  Debt 
financed government expenditure is not necessarily a burden on the economy in the sense 
of crowding out private investment and reducing the potential output producing capacity 
of the economy. To the extent that the financing of the deficit is for public investment 
expenditure there are two avenues through which this impacts favorably on agriculture. 
First,  the  increase  in  public  investment  improves  the  productivity  of  agriculture  and 
induces or crowds in private investment spending that offsets some of the crowing out 
caused  by  the  deficit  financing.  Second,  the  increased  public  investment  adds  to  the 
public capital stock and this independently of the effect on private investment enlarges 
the potential output of the economy. A government may then run a deficit and not harm 
long run economic performance if it devotes a sufficiently large part of its expenditure to 
public investment and infrastructure spending. The conclusion that deficit financing is 
associated with crowding out is tempered to the extent that public expenditure is public 
investment expenditure that improves the productivity and enhances the output of the 
economy. 
 
Investment, Subsidies and Deficits: Adjustment Difficulties 
 
Hope was placed by scholars like Rao and Gulati and Ahluwalia in the mid-nineties on 
the  fact  that  required  resources  for  setting  up  investment  in  agriculture  and  rural 
infrastructure would become available through reduction in large input subsidies. This 
view proved erroneous as it regarded total investible funds for agriculture as something 
fixed  and  ignored  the  political  economy  factors  which  made  adoption  of  a  policy  of 
subsidy reduction difficult, it also overlooked the likely impact of the fiscal constraints 
imposed by  rigid targets of reducing gross fiscal deficit which was a  major focus of 
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Declining public investment in agriculture was one of the major factors underlying the 
deceleration in agricultural growth observed in the post-reform period. It may be seen 
that  in  recent  years  i.e.  since  2003-04,  public  investment  in  agriculture  sector  has 
accelerated  leading  to  a  higher  share  of  public  sector  gross  capital  formation.  It  has 
increased from 17 per cent to 28 per cent; Gross Capital Formation in agriculture has also 
increased as a proportion of agricultural GDP after 2003-04.  Private Investment as a 
percentage of agricultural GDP also went up (latest CSO estimates private gross capital 
formation in agriculture as percentage of agricultural gross domestic product greater than 
twenty percent). 
  
According to Chand and Misra (1995), a number of economists had expressed grave 
concern about the decline in public sector capital formation in Indian Agriculture during 
the 1990’s.They said that this decline, it has been argued, is not only bad in itself; it also 
leads to a decline in private capital formation. According to them, it has been contended 
that  the  reason  for  such  a  thing  to  have  happened  lies  in  the  existence  of  high 
complementarities between public and private capital formation in agriculture. Chand and 
Misra take issue with these claims and contentions in particular with the hypothesis of 
complementarity. In the same vein Purohit and Reddy (2000) argue: 
 
“While it is convincingly argued by Misra and Chand (1995) that the complimentarity 
cannot  be  determined  by  a  simple  causal  relationship  (positive)  between  private  and 
public investment. In the same vein we argue that the substitutability of public investment 
with  private  investment  cannot  also  be  determined  by  a  simple  causal  relationship 
(negative in this case) or by looking at the compensatory impact of private investment on 
the total capital formation in agriculture. In other words, it is not right to say that private 
capital can replace public investment as long as the total investment continues to grow. 
One has to understand the implications of public vis-à-vis private investment i.e., the 
accrual of benefits from these investments. A cursory look at the type of investment by 
public and private agencies makes it clear that the benefit flows are more equitable, inter 
and  intra  regionally,  in  the  case  of  public  investment  when  compared  to  private 
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of  complimentarity  and  substitutability  between  public  and  private  investment  in 
agriculture remain secondary.” 
 
An interesting argument By Chand and Misra (1995) is conclusive: 
“The thesis of neglect of agriculture, often voiced in the literature, is in fact baseless. 
Furthermore, there is nothing disastrous about the fall in the share of a sector in total 
investment  of  the  economy  when  its  share  in  the  GDP  falls.  What  is  relevant  is  the 
sectors own rate of investment, which in the case of Indian agriculture has been rising.” 
And again- “Finally, our argument in the present study has not been against public sector 
capital formation in agriculture. Our attempt instead has been to examine the problem of 
its decline during the 1980s in the broader context rather than accept the case based upon 
the false premise of complementarity with private capital formation. 
 
Public investment in and for agriculture in the form of infrastructure will continue to be 
important on its own for agricultural  growth. Just as public investment in major and 
minor irrigation systems is necessary and desirable so is public investment in rural roads, 
power supply systems, input delivery depots and market yards, the former counted as 
investment in agriculture and the latter for agriculture.” 
 
Levels, Deficits and Efficiency 
 
There is the more general question of a high agricultural capital formation not leading to 
an adequate growth rate. There has been an increase in ICOR in recent years and the 
agricultural growth rate has not gone up although investment is growing in agriculture.  It 
can be seen that since 2003 as the primary deficit has gone down more money has gone 
into  investment  in  agriculture.  This  confirms  Chambers  argument  above.  However, 
whether efficiency in agriculture has increased or only investment has increased is the 
question begged to be asked. 
 
This empirical question needs an answer. The spliced (for 99-00) time series of Private, 
Public and Total gross capital formation is examined together with Agricultural Gross 
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Table 2 
Gross Capital Formation Overall, Private Sector and Public Sector 1990-91 to  
2008-09, three year averages (in Rs Crores at 99-00 prices) 
 





spliced for 99-2000 
prices 
Gross Capital 
Formation in Private 
Sector different series 
spliced for 99-2000 
prices 
Gross Capital 
Formation in Public 
Sector different series 
spliced for 99-2000 
prices 
90-91 to 92-93  39673  30442  8450 
94-95 to 96-97  44079  33470  9625 
97-98 to 99-00  46574  38113  8326 
2002-03 to 2004-
05 
55656  44803  10853 
2006-07 to 2008-
09 
86244  66771  19128 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, different years. 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the break is in the year 2002 onwards. The levels of public, private 
and total capital formation in agriculture rise sharply. It is also possible to estimate the 
relationship between agricultural capital formation and agricultural GDP statistically. 
 
LnY = -10.81+1.557 lnX 
 
R square = 0.62 
Where Y = Public Sector Fixed Capital Formation in the Agricultural Sector 
            X = GDP from Agriculture 
 
Ln is the exponential log and all variables are in 99-00 constant prices (spliced wherever 
necessary). 
The Incremental Capital Output Ratio of public investment in the agricultural sector for 




IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 16  W.P.  No.  2011-10-05 
So, we get an Incremental Capital Output relation of 1.55 for 1990-91 to 2008-09. 
 
It has been seen earlier that the break in the capital formation series comes in 2002. This 
relation is therefore estimated for the period 2001-02 to 2008-09. The estimate now is 
 
LnY = -37.22+3.58lnX 
R square = 0.90 
The Incremental Capital Output ratio is now estimated at 3.58 for period 2001-02 to 
2008-09. The argument that the ICOR is rising in Indian agriculture is validated, as the 
public sector ICOR goes up from 1.565 to 3.58. 
 
A similar relation is estimated for total capital formation in agriculture. Total capital 
formation in agriculture is related with agricultural gross domestic product in a double 
log  regression,  in  the  time  period  1990-91  to  2008-09.  The  following  relationship  is 
estimated: 
 
LnY = -9.25+1.55LnX 
R square = 0.90 
Where Y =  Fixed Capital Formation in the Agricultural Sector 
            X = GDP from Agriculture 
 
The Incremental Capital Output Ratio is 1.55 for 1990-91 to 2008-09. 
 
For the time period 2001-02 to 2008-09, the following relationship is estimated: 
 
LnY = -19.98+2.38lnX 
R square = 0.77 
The Incremental Capital Output Ratio is 2.38 for period 2001-02 to 2008-09, whereas for 
the period 1990-91 to 2001 the same variable is only 0.69. 
Similarly private capital formation in agriculture can be related with agricultural gross 
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LnY = -49.41+4.62lnX 
R square = 0.83 
Where Y =  Private Sector Fixed Capital Formation in the Agricultural Sector 
            X = GDP from Agriculture 
 
 
The ICOR of private capital formation in the agricultural sector is now as high as 4.62 for 
the period 1990-91 to 2008-09. The same relationship estimated for the time period 2001-
02 to 2008-09, gives the following estimates: 
 
LnY = -32.32+3.31lnX 
 
R square =. 0.63 
The ICOR is now 3.31 which is high but is not rising.  
 
Analyzing public and private investment  ICOR’s these estimates tend  to suggest that 
there are externalities in public investment in agriculture and public investment ICOR’s 
are lower. 
  
The  main  story  however  is  the  relationship  between  deficits  and  agricultural  capital 



















IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 18  W.P.  No.  2011-10-05 
Table 3 
Deficit/GDP % and Gross Capital Formation agriculture /Agricultural GDP% 
 
Year  Gross Capital 
Formation agriculture 
/agricultural  gross 




Gross Primary deficit 
as % of GDP 
99-00  12.2  -----------------  3.81 
00-01  11.1  -------------------  3.57 
01-02  13.1  ------------------  3.69 
02-03  13.96  ------------------  3.09 
03-04  12.11  -------------------  2.07 
04-05  13.09  ------------------  1.31 
05-06  13.84   .56  0.96 
06-07  14.71  .42  -0.01 
07-08  16.3  .66  -1.12 
08-09  20.35  .36  3.39 
Source: RBI, Handbook of Statistics 2011; Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, different 
years; CSO website. 
 
Since,  2005-06  as  primary  deficit  has  gone  down  as  %  of  GDP  more  investment  in 
agriculture is clearly seen. 
 
Farm Size and Policies 
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and productivity it is concluded that per capita productivity of large farms is more even 
though per unit productivity of small farmers is more (Chand, 2011)), so this leads to 
inequality with increasing expenditure and hence electoral compulsion towards subsidies 
even though public investment crowds in private investment.: 
 
Below we consider an article (D’Souza, 2008), it is to be noted that we have replaced the 
term “farmer” for “individual” and added the term “agriculture” instead of “economy” in 
certain places, of course the relevant questions that this addition leads to have been raised 
and  attempt  to  answer  them  has  been  made.  “Though  public  investment  raises  the 
productivity of private factor endowments, those with higher factor endowments benefit 
more from an increase in public investment than those with lower factor endowments. 
The wealth creating assets that (agricultural) households are endowed with unequally are 
various forms of capital-physical capital, financial capital and human capital. Physical 
capital encompasses land, housing, livestock, implements and other production durables 
that constitute tangible assets which allow production and have the potential of begetting 
income. Financial assets constitute assets with higher liquidity and lower carrying costs 
that allow (agricultural) households to make intertemporal adjustments of income that 
can be used for consumption, production and investment. Human capital includes health, 
education and nutrition that are embodied in individuals (farmers) and which translate 
into skills and abilities that are potential sources of labor, managerial and entrepreneurial 
incomes. (Agricultural)  Households have endowments of the various forms of capital 
identified at their disposal-their opportunities-which can be transformed into different 
forms of income that  can be thought of as returns to these types of capital.  In what 
follows we do not distinguish between these various forms of endowments and refer to 
the capital endowment quality in the aggregate. Public investment as we demonstrate 
increases  the  returns  to  private  capital  endowments  differentially  and  raises  its 
productivity. 
 
By disproportionately benefiting those with higher factor endowments public investment 
creates  an  incentive  for  such  individuals  to  influence  the  government’s  expenditure 
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since those with large factor endowments benefit more, inequality increases. The rise in 
inequality makes redistribution more attractive to the median voter and a government 
attentive to such preferences reallocates expenditures towards transfers and away from 
public investment. Public investment expenditure then declines when inequality has risen 
sufficiently.”(D’Souza, 2008). 
 
In the next section Errol shows how an unequal distribution of factor endowments creates 
an incentive to support public expenditures that are investment expenditures or transfer 
expenditures. He shows how inequality increases from the pursuit of influence activities 
that induce government to orient its expenditure policy towards investment expenditure. 
In the following part he shows that increasing inequality results endogenously in a greater 
emphasis of (agricultural) transfers over investment expenditures (in agriculture). 
He gives the first proposition (which we suitably modify for agriculture) as: 
 
An  increase  in  public  capital  expenditure  (for  agriculture)  increases  the  income  of  a 
capital abundant individual (farmer) more than an individual (farmer) who has a capital 
poor endowment. 
 
Hence,  capital  abundant  individuals(farmers)prefer  a  higher  level  of  public  capital 
expenditure  than  a  capital  poor  individual(farmer).Thus  we  have  contending 
citizen(agriculturist) preferences for the appropriate level of public capital expenditure (in 
agriculture)  by  the  government.  This  provides  incentives  to  individuals  (farmers)  to 
expend  resources  on  influencing  the  expenditure  policies  (on  agriculture)  by  the 
government. The government responds to this influence activity and chooses its level of 
public expenditure. 
 
Thus the second proposition suitably modified for agriculture would be: 
The influence expenditure of a group of individuals (farmers) is higher, 
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2.   The larger is the responsiveness of the government in terms of the weight given to 
the interests of a group as a result of influence activities undertaken by the group (of 
farmers). 
3.   The larger is the difference in capital endowment between the abundantly endowed 
and the poorly endowed group, and 
4.   The larger the impact of public capital on factor productivity (of agriculture). 
 
Public Investment in agriculture fell in the 90’s despite deficits increasing because Errol 
says cuts in Public expenditure were seen as costly to electoral support. Redistribution 
and transfers which attract political support became important in the 90’s. 
 
Errol’s take on this is that increased public investment (in agriculture) of the 80’s by 
raising the productivity of those with abundant factor endowments more than those with 
poorer endowments raised inequality in the economy. 
 
“The increased concentration of income at the top makes redistribution more attractive 
for the median (farmer) voter rather than public capital expenditure. This is the direct 
result of Proposition 1 where a rise in inequality (interpreted standardly as a decline in 
median income relative to mean income) increases the preference of the median income 
voter  towards  transfers  and  redistributive  expenditures  and  away  from  public  capital 
expenditure.  As  inequality  increases  the  government  becomes  more  attentive  to 
increasingly distressed median voter preferences that are decisive in electoral outcomes. 
Such  governments  reallocate  towards  (agricultural)  transfers  and  away  from  public 
investment (in agriculture). 
 
Thus we conclude: “With economic growth as a priority goal of the state it is a puzzle as 
to why public investment declined since the mid 1990’s despite no reduction in fiscal 
deficits. This paper advances the proposition that public investment affects the returns to 
the distribution of factor endowments differentially. The rise in inequality then turns the 
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borrowing  rather  than  taxation,  increased  inequality  that  creates  pressure  for 
redistributive transfer’s crowds out public investment.”(Errol D’Souza, 2008) 
 
Farm Size Productivity and Investment  
 
It is clear then that the proposition we are moving towards is that large farmers tend to be 
more biased towards public investment, in order to test this hypothesis we need to find 
out what are the factors empirically determining the efficiency of large farmers. (Sadhu 
and Singh, 2002) If the efficiency of large size farms stem from production, technical, 
financial and marketing and infrastructure economies then it is inferred that large farmers 
tend to be attracted by public investment. Similarly we need to see whether farmers of 
different size classes tend to be influenced by inputs at cheaper prices; if this is the case 
then these farmers will prefer subsidies. 
 
It is clear that production economies will be reaped by the large-sized firm and this will 
lead to an urge by the large farmer to go in for public investment. Apart from Production 
economies, technical and managerial economies also lead to an inclination for public 
investment. How does this happen? As size increases there is a higher proportion of 
capital and of land available for use, so direct overhead costs per unit of product reduce, 
as costs reduce with increasing size the farmer benefits with higher returns to the public 
investment and thus a greater demand for public investment is generated with larger size. 
Advantages to the farmer both as a buyer and seller occur due to marketing economies 
because of size; this leads to again higher returns to the farmer of public investment and 
thus generates greater demand for public investment by the farmer. 
 
Similar financial economies of scale lead to more demand for public investment with 
larger size of farms. 
 
So  what  we  need  to  consider  is  the  hypothesis  that  a  larger  firm  will  have  greater 
preference  for  public  investment.  This  reasoning  is  based  on  a  highly  positive 
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productivity then that will lead to greater returns for these farms and thus higher returns 
on public investment. However the relation of farm size with productivity is by no means 
an established fact. 
 
Are there any relevant studies in the contemporary literature explaining the phenomenon 
of  size  class  and  productivity?  The  most  contemporary  and  current  account  of  the 
relationship between farm-size and productivity is given by Chand, Prasanna and Singh 
in 2011. 
 
What  is  the  controversy?  What  was  felt  in  the  60’s  and  70’s  was  that  the  observed 
relation between farm size and per hectare productivity in India was open to debate. 
Infact it was felt that this inverse relation leading to the higher productivity of small 
holdings would disappear with the increased use and adoption of superior technology, 
modernization and growth in general.  
 
What  is  the  current  position?  The  authors  conclude  that  with  data  from  the  National 
Sample Survey from the initial years of the 21’st century it can be seen that the inverse 
relation between farm size and productivity still holds that is, it is still true that small 
holdings have larger productivity than large holdings. However in a comparative measure 
per capita productivity is lower in small holdings. 
 
Conclusion 
It follows that 
·  Macro-Economics matters in Agriculture: The forecasting model shows, if the 
economy is contracted or expanded, that will have an impact on farm/non farm 
price ratios and in turn determine output in the next year given the lags in acreage 
response. It will be also possible in this structure to work out the farm-non farm 
price  ratio  with  which  food  inflation  is  avoided  in  the  next  year.  There  is 
demonstration that macro policies impact agriculture in a significant manner. 
·  Specific Macroeconomic policies matter, including the relevant fiscal-monetary 
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as the growth rate of the economy picks up and with g > r, the debt-GDP ratio 
will in fact decline and in that sense the current debt- GDP ratio is sustainable. 
Their belief in the room for fiscal maneuver in the face of a cyclical downturn is 
based on the presumption that the debt is sustainable. Which is true in the years 
2006-2008 as shown above where the actual primary deficit/GDP ratio is below 
the sustainable deficit/GDP ratio. 
·  The place to attack Fiscal Deficits may be outside agriculture rather than focus 
on  lowering  public  investment  in  agriculture  which  may  harm  agriculture. 
(Chambers and Just, 87) This analysis Chambers and Just (87) assumes that the 
budget  is  intertemporally  constrained  so  that  any  current  flow  deficit  must  be 
made up in a later period. Relatively more spending in the first period than in the 
balanced budget case is referred to as "overspending" or "fiscal irresponsibility." 
Conceptually, for example, the first period corresponds to the 1991-2004 period 
in  India  during  which  deficits  were  high.  The  second  period  represents  the 
remainder of the 2000-2010 decade during which actions to repay some of the 
cumulative budget deficit were necessary. The second period led to higher capital 
formation when the deficit became sustainable. 
·  Fiscal and Monetary Policy can also play a output and productivity enhancing 
role,  public  investment  can  also  play  a  crowding  in  role  of  investment  in  the 
agricultural  sector.  The  conclusion  that  deficit  financing  is  associated  with 
crowding  out  is  tempered  to  the  extent  that  public  expenditure  is  public 
investment expenditure that improves the productivity and enhances the output of 
the economy and is to an extent empirically validated in this study with the lower 
ICORs of public investment. 
·  Shift from Subsidies to Public Investment may not be so easy because of fixed 
targets of fiscal deficit the political economy factors which make adoption of a 
policy of subsidy reduction difficult need to be looked at, also the likely impact of 
the  fiscal  constraints  imposed  by  rigid  targets  of  reducing  gross  fiscal  deficit 
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·  Although  public  investment  may  be  said  to  crowd  in  private  investment,  the 
objectives in both are different: the complimentarity can not be determined by a 
simple causal relationship (positive) between private and public investment. In the 
same vein the substitutability of public investment with private investment can 
not also be determined by a simple causal relationship (negative in this case) or by 
looking  at  the  compensatory  impact  of  private  investment  on  the  total  capital 
formation in agriculture. In fact in India ICORs suggest the externality role of 
public investment. 
·  There  is  the  more  general  question  of  high  agricultural  capital  formation  not 
leading to an adequate growth rate. There has been an increase in ICOR in recent 
years  but  the  agricultural  growth  rate  has  not  gone  up  although  investment  is 
growing in agriculture it can be seen that since 2005-6 as the fiscal deficit has 
improved more money has gone into investment in agriculture, (Since, 2005-06 as 
primary deficit has gone down as % of GDP more investment in agriculture is 
seen.), this confirms Chambers argument above. However whether efficiency in 
agriculture has increased or only investment has increased is the question begged 
to be asked. 
·  When public investment increases larger farmers benefit more (in the debate on   
farm size and productivity it is concluded that per capita productivity of large 
farms is more even though per unit productivity of small farmers is more (Chand, 
2011)), so this leads to inequality with increasing expenditure and hence electoral 
compulsion towards subsidies even though public investment crowds in private 
investment. We advance the proposition (converting Errol’s (2008) argument for 
public  investment  in  the  economy  to  public  investment  in  agriculture).  Public 
investment  affects  the  returns  to  the  distribution  of  factor  endowments  (in 
agriculture) differentially. The rise in inequality then turns the attention of the 
state towards redistribution. Even when expenditures are financed by borrowing 
rather than taxation, increased inequality that creates pressure for redistributive 
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